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NOTES
CALIFORNIA V. GREENWOOD: DISCARDING
THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO THE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF
GARBAGE
The fourth amendment' to the United States Constitution provides courts
with an ambiguously worded framework upon which to build a coherent and
functional system of criminal adjudication.2 The amendment proscribes
"unreasonable searches and seizures" by government authorities, and per-
mits the issuance of search warrants only after a showing of probable cause.3
In applying the fourth amendment to particular cases, the United States
Supreme Court has been forced to interpret the word "reasonable" 4 and
further, to establish a nexus between the warrant requirement clause and the
seemingly unrelated clause prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures5
of "persons, houses, papers, and effects." 6 After nearly two centuries, the
Court has failed to achieve a "clear vision" 7 of fourth amendment
jurisprudence.'
Modern technological advances and a more mobile society have added to
the countless difficulties confronting the Court in its fourth amendment in-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
2. See 1 W. E. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 1.1 (2d
ed. 1981).
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
4. "Reasonable" is one of the most indefinite but commonly used words in legal lan-
guage. See, e.g., Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision
of the Fourth Amendment Privacy.Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 687 (1985).
5. See 1 W. E. RINGEL, supra note 2, at § 1.1.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. See Tomkovicz, supra note 4, at 647 (commenting on the lack of a clear vision of
fourth amendment privacy).
8. Id.
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terpretation.9 Largely as a result of such technological advances, the Court
has shifted from an analysis based on property rights to one based on privacy
interests, in an effort to determine the interests worthy of fourth amendment
protection.'° The Court thus has ruled on contemporary issues such as au-
tomobile searches, 1 aerial surveillance,' 2 electronic surveillance and the use
of sensory enhancement devices.1 3 As a result of the theoretical shift
brought on by the Court's decisions in these areas, the Court recently ad-
dressed the search and seizure aspect of another, albeit more ancient, result
of civilized living: garbage.
In California v. Greenwood, '" the Supreme Court finally reached the gar-
bage search issue.'" The Court ruled that an individual does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy 6 in refuse placed on the street for collec-
tion.17 In Greenwood, police suspected respondents Billy Greenwood and
Dyanne Van Houten of narcotics trafficking, based upon surveillance and
reliable information. 8 Police directed the neighborhood trash collector to
empty his truck and pick up the opaque plastic bags from the curb in front
of Greenwood's residence.19 Without a warrant, police searched the bags
and found evidence of narcotics use.20 Based on their findings, police se-
cured a warrant, searched Greenwood's house, and found substantial
amounts of hashish and cocaine.2 ' Police arrested Greenwood and Van
Houten on narcotics charges.22 Both were released after posting bail, and
both continued their illicit activities. 23 As a result of a subsequent trash
9. See Wilkins, Defining the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy". An Emerging Tripar-
tite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1079 (1987).
10. See infra notes 53-90 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). For a discussion of the Carroll
automobile exception rule, see infra text accompanying notes 121-24.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 91-93.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 77-82, 105-12.
14. 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).
15. The garbage search issue had come before the United States Supreme Court in Cali-
fornia v. Rooney, 107 S. Ct. 2852 (1987) (per curiam). In Rooney, the Court ruled that be-
cause the California Supreme Court had not addressed the garbage search issue, a United
States Supreme Court decision would be "premature." Id. at 2855.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 84-86.
17. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628.
18. Id. at 1627. A neighbor alerted police to heavy late night traffic at the Greenwood
residence, with vehicles usually staying for only a matter of minutes. Laguna Beach police
officer Jenny Stracner began her own surveillance of the residence and noticed the same late
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search, conducted in the same manner, both were arrested again.24
Relying on People v. Krivda,25 which held that warrantless trash searches
violated the California Constitution 26 and the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution,27 the California Superior Court dismissed
charges against Greenwood and Van Houten.28 The Court of Appeal af-
firmed,29 stating that although warrantless trash searches no longer violated
state law under Krivda,3° use of evidence seized as a result of such searches
violated federal law.3 The California Supreme Court denied review, and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.32
Justice White's majority opinion33 reversed the California Court of Ap-
peal, ruling that society does not accept as objectively reasonable a subjective
expectation of privacy in trash left on the street.34 The Court determined
that trash placed outside the curtilage35 of the home is sufficiently open to
public view to bar the respondents' fourth amendment claim. 36
A dissenting Justice Brennan,37 in a lengthy and spirited exegesis, criti-
cized the majority for its disregard of previous court rulings regarding closed
container searches,38 and expressed concern about the individual privacy
24. Id. at 1627-28.
25. 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), vacated, 409 U.S. 33 (1972).
26. People v. Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 624, 504 P.2d 457, 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521, 521
(1973).
27. Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d at 624, 504 P.2d at 557, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
28. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628.
29. People v. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d 729, 227 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1986).
30. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). The California Constitution was amended in 1982 to
bar the suppression of evidence seized in violation of state but not federal law.
31. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 734, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
32. California v. Greenwood, 107 S. Ct. 3260 (1987).
33. The Court was divided 6-2. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1627; see infra note 211.
34. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628.
35. Curtilage is a common law concept that extended the protection of burglary laws to
the areas immediately surrounding a house. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300
(1987). Although the Supreme Court often employed this concept in fourth amendment
claims involving trespass upon real property, there had never been any criteria for determining
the precise boundaries of curtilage. In Dunn, a case involving a warrantless police entrance
into a barn where the respondent was producing controlled chemical substances, the Court
proposed four factors for resolving curtilage questions:
[1] the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, [2] whether the
area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, [3] the nature of the uses
to which the area is put, and (4] the steps taken by the resident to protect the area
from observation by people passing by.
Id. at 301. Justice White, writing for the majority, suggested that these factors are not to be
construed as controlling in every situation, but rather to be used as "analytical tools." Id.
36. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628.
37. Justice Brennan was joined in his dissent by Justice Marshall. Id. at 1627.
38. Id. at 1632-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the closed container
search issue, see infra text accompanying notes 120-50.
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and public policy implications of Court-sanctioned warrantless trash
searches. a9 The dissent deemed the search of the respondents' trash illegal
because of the often private nature of the contents in trash containers, an
interest, according to the dissent, worthy of constitutional protection.'
Despite the provocative issues Justice Brennan raised, a review of state
and federal court opinions illustrates that the decision in California v. Green-
wood was nearly a foregone conclusion from the outset.41 Nevertheless, the
garbage search issue always has proved troublesome for courts,42 particu-
larly since the Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Katz v. United States,43
that the fourth amendment protects "privacy, not property."" Courts thus
were given a new and more amorphous standard by which to adjudicate
fourth amendment search and seizure claims, including trash searches.45
This Note first will examine the property-based interpretations of the
fourth amendment as the amendment applies to warrantless searches and
seizures. Next, this Note will discuss the reasonable expectation of privacy
test promulgated in Katz, and how this test has affected search and seizure
jurisprudence regarding closed container searches over the past two decades.
This Note then will examine the unique analyses courts have used in dealing
with abandoned property and refuse. Further, this Note will analyze the
decision in California v. Greenwood, its impact on the Katz test, and the
issues the dissent raised. This Note will conclude that although the fourth
amendment primarily protects the reasonable expectation of privacy, the
Court erroneously failed to consider the abandoned property analysis devel-
oped by other courts as a legitimate means for denying fourth amendment
protection.
I. PROPERTY-BASED FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS:
A VICTIM OF PROGRESS
A. The English Roots of the American Doctrine
In 1765, the English decision Entick v. Carrington16 laid the foundation
for the American approach to challenging searches conducted under govern-
39. See Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1633-37.
40. Id. at 1634.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 199-201.
42. 1 W. R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.6(c) (2d ed. 1987).
43. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
44. Id. at 351.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 77-90.
46. See Wilkins, supra note 9, at 1082-84 (citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's St. Tr.
1030 (1765)). Entick greatly influenced the framers of the United States Constitution, and the
case is particularly renowned for Lord Camden's proscription of the general warrant. See also
I W. R. LAFAVE, supra note 42, § 1.1(a).
[Vol. 38:543
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ment authority." Entick established the test for determining the legitimacy
of a search: a balance of public necessity versus the individual rights of the
person being searched.48 These individual rights, however, were based on
the common law action of trespass,49 and thus the concept of illegal search
and seizure was based upon individual property rights.50 American courts
later adopted this property-based method of adjudicating unreasonable gov-
ernment searches because it provided a concrete and simple standard to fol-
low, and the language of the Constitution provided for no other analysis.51
Under the property-based standard, protected areas were those provided in
the fourth amendment itself: "[P]ersons, houses, papers, and effects." 52
B. The Early American Approach: A Literal Interpretation
The seminal American search and seizure case was Boyd v. United
States,53 a case involving the forced production of the petitioner's private
papers, which allegedly tied him to import duty fraud.54 In Boyd, the
Supreme Court formally accepted the trespass or property-based fourth
amendment standard because "papers" are property that the fourth amend-
ment protects, and a warrant is required to search such property. 55 The
47. Wilkins, supra note 9, at 1083.
48. See id.
49. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, ch. 3 (5th ed. 1984) (complete discussion of the property
torts, including trespass).
50. See Wilkins, supra note 9, at 1083.
51. Id. at 1083-85.
52. 1 W. R. LAFAVE, supra note 42, § 2.1(a).
53. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
54. Id. at 617-18.
55. Justice Bradley cited Lord Camden's opinion in Entick:
The great end for which men entered society was to secure their property....
[E]very invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass.... It is now
incumbent upon the defendants to show the law by which this seizure is warranted.
If that cannot be done, it is a trespass.... Papers are the owner's goods and chattels.
They are his dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure that they will
hardly bear an inspection....
Id. at 627-28
Boyd stands as one of the most important and influential fourth amendment decisions,
largely because the Court, for the first time, recognized a nexus between the fourth and fifth
amendments. After citing a lengthy passage from Entick, Justice Bradley observed:
The principles laid down in [the Entick] opinion affect the very essence of constitu-
tional liberty and security. . . . [T]hey apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employ[ee]s of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of
life .... [I]t is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property... -it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies
and constitutes the essence of [Entick] .... [A]ny forcible and compulsory extortion
of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict
1989]
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decision was based on the petitioner's property interest in the papers;56 the
Court's reasoning in this respect appears rudimentary today. The Court
stated that if the papers involved were stolen, the petitioner would have no
fourth amendment claim because no property interest existed in the goods."
Emphasis on physical invasion continued into the twentieth century.
58
Olmstead v. United States,59 a case in which a telephone wiretap gathered
incriminating evidence of a prohibition era liquor procurement and sales
business, clearly set out the Court's equation of property rights with fourth
amendment rights.6" The Supreme Court ruled that the installation of a
listening device without any trespass upon property of the defendants6' did
not amount to a warrantless search, plainly illustrating the Court's rigid ad-
herence to a property-based fourth amendment theory.62
The Court applied this property-based search and seizure doctrine again
in Goldman v. United States,63 in which a "detectaphone" placed against the
wall of an office was held not to constitute an unlawful search, because
placement of the device against the common wall involved no physical inva-
him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of [Entick]. In this
regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.
Id. at 630. The Court subsequently found the forced production of the petitioner's papers
unconstitutional. Id. at 638.
56. Important to note, however, is Justice Bradley's linking of property interests with the
"privacies of life," an early acknowledgement that privacy is an interest tied to one's property.
Id. at 630. Thus, Boyd is recognized as one of the most progressive fourth amendment deci-
sions of its era. See Tomkovicz, supra note 4, at 646, 649 n.21.
57. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 624; see also Wilkins, supra note 9, at 1084.
58. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
59. Id. The petitioners in Olmstead were convicted of violating the National Prohibition
Act. The wiretap that produced evidence used in the government's prosecution was activated
and controlled entirely from a separate building. Id. at 456-57.
60. Id. at 464-65. Chief Justice Taft was not persuaded by Justice Bradley's call in Boyd
to construe the fourth amendment more liberally, taking into consideration vague notions such
as the "privacies of life." The Chief Justice did not construe Boyd as compelling the Court to
extend fourth amendment protection beyond "persons, houses, papers, and effects." Id. at
465. Olmstead therefore represents a more literal application of the fourth amendment lan-
guage than even that found in Boyd.
Justice Brandeis' lengthy dissent, however, is an early example of a privacy-based analysis:
"[E]very unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.... It
is, of course, immaterial where the physical connection with the telephone wires leading to the
defendants' premises was made." Id. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 457.
62. Id. at 466.
63. 316 U.S. 129 (1942). Justice Murphy, in his Goldman dissent, also hinted at a need
for a new mode of fourth amendment analysis: "The conditions of modern life have greatly
expanded the range and character of those activities which require protection from intrusive
action by Government officials if men and women are to enjoy the full benefit of that privacy
which the Fourth Amendment was intended to provide." Id. at 138 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 38:543
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sion of the petitioner's office. 6 ' The Court simply refused to find any practi-
cal distinction between the use of a detectaphone and an Olmstead wiretap.65
As Olmstead and Goldman illustrate, the property-based standard in
search cases survived technological advancements allowing government au-
thorities to obtain evidence of criminal activity without risking physical tres-
pass.66 Although the Court freed itself somewhat of the strictures of the
property-based standard by extending the range of areas in which a person
could have a property interest worthy of constitutional protection,67 such as
hotel rooms,68 offices,69 and in limited circumstances, automobiles, 70 elec-
tronic surveillance provided the Court with the dilemma of how to apply the
property-based standard to situations in which the government perpetrated a
different, though no less furtive, type of invasion.
C. Recognizing the Privacy Interest
The Court hinted at its growing frustration with the use of the property
theory in resolving contemporary search issues in Silverman v. United
States,71 a case that foreshadowed the end of the property-based standard.
In Silverman, police placed a "spike mike" listening device into the party
wall of an attached home, and listened to incriminating conversations re-
garding a gambling operation.72 Because the device touched the heating
ducts of the petitioner's home, effectively conducting sound, the Court found
a trespass under the Olmstead and Goldman analyses.73 Silverman did not
overrule the factually similar Goldman case, and the Court "decline[d] to go
beyond [Goldman], by even a fraction of an inch."' 74 The Court cautioned,
however, that fourth amendment rights are not measurable in terms of the
inveterate tort or real property common laws, 75 thus expressing dissatisfac-
64. Id. at 134-35.
65. Id. at 135.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 59-65.
67. 1 W. R. LAFAVE, supra note 42, § 2.1(a).
68. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
69. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932). Lefkowitz is an early example of the
Court's recognition of a fourth amendment "right to privacy." Id at 464. But as in Boyd,
privacy was recognized as an important interest within the bounds of a physical place, and it
was not elevated to the level of a new constitutional standard.
70. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366-68 (1964).
71. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
72. Id. at 506.
73. Id. at 506-07.
74. Id. at 512.
75. Id. at 511. The Court cited to Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960). Jones
involved a warrant search by police of the petitioner's friend's apartment for illegal narcotics.
The principle issue in the case was whether the petitioner had standing to make a motion to
suppress the evidence found. The Court rejected the importation into constitutional search
1989]
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tion with a constitutional interpretation that does not provide protection be-
yond the notions of a physical property trespass. The Court delivered the
final blow to the property-based standard seven years later, in Katz v. United
States.76
II. FROM PROPERTY TO PRIVACY: KATZ
AND THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES
A. Katz and Its Implications
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court resoundingly rejected the
property-based interpretation of the fourth amendment 77 in favor of a new
privacy-based standard for fourth amendment search analysis.78 Katz in-
volved the placement of an electronic bugging device upon a telephone booth
in which the petitioner was communicating wagering information in viola-
tion of a federal statute. 79 The Court overruled both Olmstead and
Goldman, because of the erosion of the trespass doctrine in subsequent deci-
sions such as Silverman."o The Court recognized that fourth amendment
protection extends to oral communication, and formally adopted the dicta in
Silverman that criticized the property law approach to fourth amendment
claims.' The Court emphasized that "[tlhe Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places." 2
After Katz, an area cannot be subject to a warrantless search if an individ-
ual holds a privacy interest in that area, regardless of the individual's prop-
erty rights in the area. 3 Justice Harlan, in a brief concurring opinion,
formulated the two-prong reasonable expectation of privacy test now used to
and seizure jurisprudence of common law distinctions between licensees, invitees, and guests.
See id. at 266.
76. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
77. Id. Nevertheless, Justice Stewart, author of the majority opinion, cited instances in
which the Court has found constitutionally protected interests in areas outside the home, such
as business offices, friends' apartments, and taxicabs; and remarked: "One who occupies (a
phone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is
surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to
the world." Id. at 352. But Justice Stewart emphasized that it is no longer the place that is
determinative of fourth amendment protection. Id. at 351.
78. Id. at 351-52. Justice Stewart, cautioned, however, that "the Fourth Amendment
cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy.' . . . the protection of a
person's general right to privacy.... is, like the protection of his property and his very life, left
largely to the law of the individual States." Id. at 350-51 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 348.
80. Id. at 353.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 351.
83. See generally id. at 351-53. Justice Stewart writes: "One it is recognized that the
Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches
(Vol. 38:543
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evaluate the reasonableness of searches and seizures.8 4 This test requires
that: one, a person must first exhibit an actual expectation of privacy in the
given area or interest; and two, this expectation must be one that society
accepts as reasonable. 85 The Court analyzes the first prong subjectively,
while the second prong is analyzed according to objective factors. 86 Numer-
ous cases following the decision illustrate the Supreme Court's reliance on
the Katz standard in circumstances that never before would have received
fourth amendment consideration. 7 But many of these cases also show how
the Katz rule has proved difficult in application. 88 Whereas the property-
based standard often hinged upon the relatively simple concrete issue of
physical trespass, the reasonable expectation of privacy standard requires
more abstract determinations of both a criminal defendant's expectations of
privacy, and society's views.89 Thus, rather than giving courts a practical
tool for adjudicating search issues, the Katz standard has produced a con-
fused and fragmented jurisprudence regarding searches.90
B. Narrowing Katz: Unreasonable Expectations
A number of cases show the Court's reluctance to give full force to the
privacy interests set forth in Katz. One such case is California v. Ciraolo,9"
involving the aerial surveillance of the petitioner's fenced-in back yard,
which revealed a marijuana crop. The Court ruled that the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test was not met because any member of the general
public flying over the petitioner's property at a low altitude could have seen
what the officers in the airplane saw.92 The Court acknowledged that by
erecting a ten foot fence, the petitioners exhibited an expectation of privacy,
but the Court refused to concede that this expectation was reasonable in an
era of frequent and often low-flying air travel, and thus the search was
and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the pres-
ence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." Id. at 353.
84. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Although Justice Stewart's majority opinion ex-
pressed the same concepts of privacy, Justice Harlan's concurring opinion is recognized as the
principle rationale of Katz. Wilkins, supra note 9, at 1086-87.
85. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
86. See id.
87. See 1 W. R. LAFAVE, supra note 42, § 2. l(b).
88. See infra text accompanying notes 120-50.
89. See 1 W. R. LAFAVE, supra note 42, § 2.1(b).
90. See id; see generally Wilkins, supra note 9, at 1086-91. (discussing the difficulty courts
have had in applying Katz).
91. 476 U.S. 207 (1986). For a discussion of the Ciraolo decision, see Comment, Dow
Chemical and Ciraolo: For Government Investigators the Sky's No Limit, 36 CATH U.L. REV.
667 (1987).
92. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
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valid.9a
Similarly, in Oliver v. United States, 94 the Court ruled that the petitioner
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the fields around his
home.9" Police arrived at the petitioner's farm and came upon a locked gate
with a "No Trespassing" sign.96 They walked along a fence for a mile and
found a marijuana field.97 The Court in Oliver re-affirmed the "open fields"
doctrine, first announced in 1924 in Hester v. United States,9" which held
that a person does not have a fourth amendment interest in the open fields
around his home, because open fields do not fall under "persons, houses,
papers, and effects." 99 In Oliver, however, the Court did not address the
Hester holding as a strictly textual interpretation of the fourth amendment,
but rather determined that the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy was
fully consistent with, and applicable to, the open fields doctrine."°° The
Court found that the petitioner could not hold a "legitimate"' 1 expectation
of privacy in the field in which he grew his illicit crop, because society was
not prepared to accept such an expectation as reasonable. 102 The Court de-
clared that open fields "do not provide a setting for those intimate activities
that the Amendment is intended to shelter"'1 3 and that, regardless of the
presence of a "No Trespassing" sign, such areas are open to public
viewing.' °4
A significant post-Katz electronic surveillance case was Smith v. Mary-
land.'°5 In Smith, the Supreme Court declared, after a glowing reaffirma-
tion of Katz, 106 that the government's use of a pen register 10 7 presented no
fourth amendment violation.'0" In this case, police directed the phone com-
93. Id.
94. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
95. Id. at 181.
96. Id. at 173.
97. Id.
98. 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
99. Id.
100. 466 U.S. at 178-81; Note, Oliver v. United States: The Open Fields Doctrine Survives
Katz, 63 N.C.L. REV. 546 (1985); Comment, Curtilage or Open Fields?: Oliver v. United
States Gives Renewed Significance to the Concept of Curtilage in Fourth Amendment Analysis,
46 U. PITT L. REV. 795 (1985).
101. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 179.
104. Id.
105. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
106. Id. at 739-41.
107. A pen register is a device that records the telephone numbers dialed from a particular
telephone. See Fishman, Pen Registers and Privacy: Risks, Expectations, and the Nullification
of Congressional Intent, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 557, 558 (1980).
108. 442 U.S. at 744-46.
[Vol. 38:543
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pany to attach a pen register to the telephone of a robbery suspect to record
all numbers dialed from that phone."° The pen register, installed and acti-
vated from the phone company offices, recorded the victim's phone
number. ' In addressing the petitioner's claim that the use of the pen regis-
ter required a warrant, the Court ruled that the petitioner failed to demon-
strate the legitimacy of an expectation of privacy as to numbers dialed.'
The Court held that society accepts the conveyance of phone numbers to the
phone company, and thus any privacy interest in these numbers is not
reasonable.' 1
2
Ciraolo, Oliver and Smith represent a discernible trend in the Supreme
Court's approach to the reasonable expectation of privacy test. In all three
cases, the Court rejected claims that an expectation of privacy was reason-
able. In Ciraolo and Oliver the respondent had manifested a subjective pri-
vacy expectation by means of a fence," 13 or the remote location of the illegal
activity on the property." 4 In Smith the petitioner similarly argued his ex-
pectation that law enforcement officials would not monitor his phone
calls." '5 While recent commentary suggests that the Court is slowly re-
turning to the property-based theory," 6 these cases illustrate, rather, the
Court's narrowing of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test" 7 by
placing emphasis on the reasonableness element of the second prong of the
test. Further, it appears that the Court defines society's view of reasonable-
ness in terms of the degree to which the defendant exposes his activity to
third parties." 8 The respondents in Ciraolo and Oliver exposed their mari-
juana crops to anyone flying over, or passing through, the open fields of their
109. Id. at 737-38. The suspect's automobile and license plate number matched the de-
scription provided by the robbery victim. The victim also complained of threatening phone
calls from a man claiming to be the robber. Id.
110. Id. at 737.
Ill. Id. at 744.
112. Id.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 94-104.
115. Justice Blackmun, in his Smith majority opinion, did not view the use of a pen register
as being as intrusive as a wiretap or other means of electronic surveillance: "When he used his
phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and
'exposed' that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business." 442 U.S. at
744; see also supra text accompanying notes 105-12.
116. See generally Comment, Reviving Trespass-based Search Analysis Under the Open View
Doctrine.- Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 191 (1988). Dow Chemical
was a companion case to Ciraolo. The author concludes that the case represents a return to
the property-based search theory. Id. at 228.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
118. See generally Comment, supra note 116, where the author takes the view that this new
standard of reasonableness signifies a reversion to the property-based standard.
The Court's reasoning in these cases, involving exposure of criminal activity to third parties,
1989]
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property. The petitioner in Smith exposed not the conversation, but the
numbers dialed, to the phone company.
Although these three cases suggest that Katz has been considerably nar-
rowed, the reasonable expectation of privacy test has worked fairly well in
search cases involving visual or audio observation, and particularly well re-
garding electronic surveillance, an area where little pre-Katz law existed.
Applying the Katz test to the types of searches that pre-dated the modem
electronic era has proven more difficult." 9
III. KATZ-RESULTANT PROPERTY THEORIES
A. Container Searches
The Supreme Court's treatment of container searches demonstrates its
failure to achieve a coherent privacy standard with regards to tangible per-
sonal property.' 20 The confusion has resulted chiefly from containers found
in automobiles, largely because the area of automobile searches has also pro-
vided courts with a difficult standard.' 2 ' This standard was developed in
Carroll v. United States.'22 In Carroll, the Court adopted the "automobile
exception" rule, which allows police who have stopped a vehicle to conduct
a warrantless search, provided that there is probable cause to believe that the
vehicle contains contraband. '2 3 That police were "searching" an automobile
under this rule was only implied from the decision, and Carroll left the per-
missible scope of such searches to future courts, an issue with which courts
still struggle.' 2 4
The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test only compounded the
confusion wrought by the Carroll automobile exception rule.' 2 5 United
States v. Chadwick 126 involved the seizure of a footlocker as it was being
placed into the trunk of the respondent's vehicle.' 2 7 A later warrantless
has developed into the "plain view" doctrine. For a discussion of the plain view doctrine, see
W. E. RINGEL supra note 2, § 6.5(a).
119. See infra text accompanying notes 120-50.
120. See generally Wilkins, supra note 9, at 1091-96.
121. See id. at 1091.
122. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The Carroll automobile exception is still valid law today. See,
e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
123. See Carroll 267 U.S. at 149; see also Note, Warrantless Vehicle Searches and the
Fourth Amendment. The Burger Court Attacks the Exclusionary Rule, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
105 (1982).
124. See Wilkins, supra note 9, at 1091.
125. See generally id. at 1091-96.
126. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
127. Id. at 4.
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search of the footlocker revealed marijuana.12 The Court determined that
the respondent held a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of
the footlocker.129 Regardless of the diminished privacy interest in the vehi-
cle, the automobile exception rule did not apply to containers that serve as a
"repository of personal effects,"' 3° and therefore the search was
unconstitutional. '31
The Chadwick holding was clouded, however, in Arkansas v. Sanders, 132 a
case involving the search of a brief case seized in a taxicab. The Court de-
clared that fourth amendment rights were violated because of the type of
container involved, 133 thus implying that some containers deserved constitu-
tional protection while others did not. 134 Sanders resulted in attempts by
lower federal courts to determine exactly what type of container was worthy
of protection. 135
The closed container automobile search issue appeared settled with the
Court's decision in Robbins v. California. 136 In Robbins, police seized bricks
of marijuana wrapped in opaque plastic from the trunk of the petitioner's
car. 137 The Court ruled that the search and seizure of the wrapped packages
was illegal, and concluded that any sealed container in an automobile en-
joyed constitutional protection. 13' The Court refused to recognize any dis-
tinction between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers. 139 This decision did
not overrule the Carroll automobile exception rule, but modified it with re-
spect to sealed containers found in automobiles.'40
Only one year later, the Court abandoned the Robbins holding in United
States v. Ross. 4 ' Ross involved a warrantless police search of a paper bag
128. Id.
129. Id. at 13.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 442 U.S. 753 (1979). Sanders was decided on the same day as Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes 105-12.
133. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764-65; see also Wilkins, supra note 9, at 1092-93.
134. See Wilkins, supra note 9, at 1092.
135. Id. at 1093.
136. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
137. Id. at 422.
138. Id. at 426-27.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 424. The majority stated that "[iun recent years, we have twice been confronted
with the suggestion that this 'automobile exception' somehow justifies the warrantless search
of a closed container found inside an automobile. Each time, the Court has refused to accept
the suggestion." Id. (referring to United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) and Arkansas
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)).
141. 456 U.S. 798 (1982); see Comment, Search and Seizure. From Carroll to Ross, the
Odyssey of the Automobile Exception, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 221 (1982); Note, The Scope of
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and zippered leather pouch found in the trunk of the respondent's car,, 42
both of which contained narcotics.143 While still rejecting the worthy-un-
worthy container. distinction, 1" the Court gave renewed strength to the Car-
roll automobile exception by ruling that if police have authority to conduct a
warrantless search of a vehicle, based on specifically defined probable cause,
they have authority to search any container within that automobile that may
contain the object of the search.145 The Court provided the caveat that a
search is limited to only those containers that could possibly hold the object
for which the police were searching.' 4 6 Although the Court rejected some of
the Sanders reasoning and the holding in Robbins, Ross overruled neither of
these cases. 147
Ross demonstrates the ultimate failure of the Katz reasonable expectation
of privacy test in cases involving closed containers in automobiles. 148 While
the Court in Chadwick and Sanders specifically relied on Katz, the reason-
able expectation of privacy test proved immaterial to the Ross holding, be-
cause privacy expectations in containers yielded to a police officer's probable
cause that the container held contraband.149 While a more thorough exami-
nation of the closed container cases is beyond the scope of this Note, these
cases show that the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test was simply
too unclear as a practical standard to apply to the container search issue.15
B. Abandoned Property
Another important line of fourth amendment cases concerns abandoned
property. Where an owner of personal property intentionally abandons the
property, all interest in that property is severed, and police may seize such
Warrantless Searches Under the Automobile Exception: United States v. Ross, 43 LA. L. REV.
1561 (1983).
142. Ross, 456 U.S. at 801.
143. Id. at 800-01.
144. Id. at 824.
145. See id. at 809-14.
146. Id. at 824.
147. Id. at 820-21. The Court ruled that:
A warrant to search a vehicle would support a search of every part of that vehicle
that might contain the object of the search. When a legitimate search is under way,
and when its purpose and its limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions ...
must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at
hand.
Id. at 821. Further, the Court said that "[t]he scope ofa warrantless search based on probable
cause is no narrower-and no broader-than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant
supported by probable cause." Id. at 823.
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property without probable cause. 1 ' Simply phrased, the fourth amendment
does not extend to abandoned property.152Abandonment is a property con-
cept, 153 most often revolving around the factual issue of the criminal defend-
ant's intent. 154
The Supreme Court addressed the abandonment issue in Hester v. United
States, 155 which involved a bottle of moonshine whiskey discarded in a field
during a police pursuit. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, deter-
mined that the bottle was abandoned and the petitioner, therefore, was not
entitled to fourth amendment protection when the police seized the bottle., 56
Similarly, in Abel v. United States, 157 the Court ruled that the petitioner
abandoned, in a hotel waste basket, incriminating papers related to a federal
espionage investigation and therefore could claim no fourth amendment pro-
tection.'"5 The Court in both Hester and Abel relied on abandoned property
concepts to determine the constitutionality of the seizure.159 Hester was
based on the "open fields" doctrine, 16 while the Abel Court based its deci-
sion on the items in question being "bona vacantia,"'1 61 a common law prop-
erty-based abandonment doctrine.
Courts have adopted a unique approach to the search and seizure of aban-
doned property in most post-Katz criminal proceedings, considering con-
cepts of both property law and modem constitutional privacy
interpretation.162 Courts often use the property element of the issue as a
starting point in their decisional process, before moving on to the more im-
portant and decisive privacy issue.'63 If courts find abandonment, they often
conclude that the criminal defendant retained no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the particular item because the defendant abandoned it.' 64 Post-
Katz courts have adopted this modified reasonable expectation of privacy
151. See Mascolo, The Role of Abandonment in the Law of Search and Seizure: An Appli-
cation of Misdirected Emphasis, 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 399, 400-01 (1971).
152. See id. at 400-01; see also 1 W. R. LAFAVE, supra note 42, § 2.6(b).
153. Mascolo, supra note 151, at 401.
154. Id. at 404.
155. 265 U.S. 57 (1924); see supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
156. Hester, 265 U.S. at 58-59.
157. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
158. Id. at 218-20.
159. See 1 W. R. LAFAVE, supra note 42, § 2.6(b).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
161. Black's Law Dictionary describes bona vacantia as: "Vacant goods; unclaimed prop-
erty. Generally, personal property which escheats to [the] state because no owner, heir or next
of kin claims it. Now includes real as well as personal property and passes to state as an
incident of sovereignty." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 161 (5th ed. 1979).
162. Mascolo, supra note 151, at 400-01.
163. Id. at 401.
164. See generally id. at 400-02. (discussing the unique "dual qualities" of the abandon-
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test on both the state165 and federal 166 levels, and although it is not fully
consistent with the two prong Katz test, it at least recognizes the privacy
interest of the first prong.
C. Trash: A Pre-Greenwood Analysis
Trash is a specific type of abandoned property. 167  Objectively, trash
searches involve some invasion of a person's privacy. 168 All of what we do
in our personal lives results in some form of waste 169 and this waste can
reveal much about our day-to-day activities.'7 ° State and federal garbage
search cases illustrate that the question of whether police have impermissibly
invaded an individual's privacy is a matter of degree, depending upon the
location and type of trash container. 171 Courts must balance individual and
state interests, whether a search takes place in a receptacle in a person's back
yard,' 7 2 or in a plastic bag left on the sidewalk for collection.' 73 Moreover,
large public receptacles for apartment dwellers add to the problem, as trash
is sometimes viewed as losing its identification to a particular individual
when it is mingled with the refuse of others. 17
4
Pre-Katz trash search law made the trash issue relatively simple. Courts
found two factors dispositive: intentional abandonment and police intrusion
upon the curtilage.' 75 In United States v. Minker, 176 for example, the search
for papers linking the respondent to a gaming operation occurred in a dump-
ster outside the curtilage of the respondent's apartment unit, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit deemed the disposed papers
abandoned. 177 By disposing of the papers in a common receptacle, the re-
ment issue: post-Katz courts consider both the individual privacy interest and the property
element of abandonment).
165. See 1 W. R. LAFAVE, supra note 42, § 2.6(b).
166. Id.
167. Id. § 2.6(c).
168. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1634-35 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(searching trash akin to searching a bedroom).
169. See, e.g., Venner v. State, 279 Md. 47, 367 A.2d 949, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977)
(human excrement in a bedpan is abandoned property).
170. See Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1634-35.
171. Cf People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
Edwards is discussed infra text accompanying notes 186-92.
172. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d at 1096, 458 P.2d at 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
173. See People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971).
174. See United States v. Minker, 312 F.2d 632 (3d. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 953
(1963); cf Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973).
175. 1 W. R. LAFAVE, supra note 42, § 2.6(c).
176. 312 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1962).
177. Id. at 634; see also 1 W. R. LAFAVE, supra note 42, § 2.6(c).
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spondent demonstrated the requisite intent to abandon.' 78 Conversely, in
Work v. United States 179 the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit found an intrusion upon the curtilage of the home, be-
cause of police entry into the petitioner's house and their search for evidence
of narcotics violations in a trash receptacle under the back porch.' 8 ' More-
over, the petitioner's conduct evinced no intent to abandon an incriminating
vial of pills, thus the court held the search unconstitutional.' 8'
After Katz, courts typically resolved the problem of trash searches by ap-
plying the abandoned property standard, modified by the reasonable expec-
tation of privacy test; individuals surrender their privacy expectation when
they discard their trash."8 2 This type of analysis mingles privacy and prop-
erty concepts; privacy is the protected interest, but abandonment is a key
element in the disposition of the case.183 This analysis is generally consistent
with the fourth amendment privacy interpretation, although it does not rep-
resent an application of the two prong Katz test.' 84
On occasion, courts have strictly applied the Katz rule in trash search
178. Minker, 312 F.2d at 634; see also 1 W. R. LAFAVE, supra note 42, § 2.6(c).
179. 243 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
180. Id. at 661; see also 1 W. R. LAFAVE, supra note 42, § 2.6(c).
181. Work, 243 F.2d at 662; see also 1 W. R. LAFAVE, supra note 42, § 2.6(c).
182. See United States v. O'Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528, 1533-34 (1 1th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Michaels, 726 F.2d 1307, 1312-13 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984); United States
v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 308-09 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983). Often courts will
not even consider the privacy issue, abandonment being the sole dispositive element. See
United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Kramer,
711 F.2d 789, 791-94 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 962 (1983).
Chief Judge Cummings, in his opinion in Kramer, generously offers those involved in crimi-
nal activity a choice before discarding evidence of their illicit activities in their trash:
Of course people sometimes do not want others to see things.., that they sometimes
throw away. But people can easily prevent this by destroying what they want to keep
secret before they discard it, or by not discarding it. Defendant [Kramer] could have
burned or shredded his drug records before he discarded them or kept them hidden
somewhere in his house.... There is nothing unfair about requiring that people not
discard things they want to keep secret, or destroy them before they do.
Id. at 792. Judge Cummings also found the police trespass upon the respondent's property, to
seize the trash bags, was not violative of the fourth amendment because the seizure did not
disturb the respondent's peace, privacy or enjoyment of his property; and was comparable to a
trash collection intrusion. This reasoning is odd to say the least-permitting trespass because
of a lack of a privacy interest. This novel approach appears contrary to the venerable curtilage
doctrine. Id. at 794.
The court in United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397 (3rd Cir. 1981), did, however, apply
the two prong Katz test. As in Greenwood, the second prong was nullified by the respondent's
exposure of his trash to the public. But unlike Greenwood, the Court also considered the aban-
donment theory. The respondent's individual expectation of privacy was not subjectively rea-
sonable because of his intentional abandonment of his trash. Id. at 399.
183. See supra note 164.
184. See 1 W. R. LAFAVE, supra note 42, § 2.6(c).
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cases. 185 In People v. Edwards186 police trespassed upon the respondent's
property to search a trash receptacle at his back door, and found mari-
juana.1 87 The respondents later were arrested and convicted. 18 8 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court acknowledged the trespass, but decided the case based
on the respondent's expectation of privacy in his trash. 189 The court found
that because the respondents occupied the house, and the marijuana was not
readily visible in the receptacle without searching through it, they main-
tained a privacy interest in the container.19 ° The court rejected the aban-
donment theory, stating that the trash was abandoned only as to authorized
trash collectors. '' Although factually similar to Work, the determinative
element in Edwards was not the act of abandonment, but rather the respon-
dent's expectation of privacy in his trash.192
Another California case, People v. Krivda, 193 extended this expectation of
privacy to trash placed on the street for collection. The respondent in
Krivda allegedly injected her children with dangerous narcotics, and partici-
pated in other illicit drug-related activities.' 94 Police directed the local trash
collector to pick up and sequester the respondent's trash. ' 95 A search of the
trash revealed evidence of marijuana usage. 196 Addressing the motion to
suppress on appeal, the California Supreme Court cited local ordinances that
allowed only licensed collectors to pick up trash, and which prohibited
members of the general public from tampering with trash.197 The court,
relying on both Katz and Edwards, concluded that a person can reasonably
expect that his trash remain free from warrantless police searches. 198
185. See, e.g., People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969);
see also 1 W. R. LAFAVE, supra note 42, § 2.6(c).
186. 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
187. Id. at 1098-99, 458 P.2d at 714, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1104, 458 P.2d at 718, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See 1 W. R. LAFAVE, supra note 42, § 2.6(c).
193. 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal Rptr. 62 (1971).
194. Id. at 360, 486 P.2d at 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 366, 486 P.2d at 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 68. The court also emphasized that
people expect their trash to remain free from examination by the public or law enforcement
officials "at least ... until the trash has lost its identity and meaning by becoming part of a
large conglomeration of trash elsewhere." Id.
198. Id. at 365, 486 P.2d at 1267, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 67. The court noted that "[t]he fact that
a search may or may not involve a trespass or other invasion of defendant's property interests
is not conclusive, for 'The prohibition in the [fourth] amendment is against unreasonable
searches and seizures, not trespasses.'" Id.
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Viewing trash search law as a whole, the vast majority of both state199 and
federal2°° courts hold that trash is abandoned property in which an individ-
ual has no reasonable expectation of privacy. 2' Edwards and Krivda repre-
sent the minority view. While the United States Supreme Court in
California v. Greenwood202 confirmed as a constitutional standard that a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy does not exist in trash, the Court did not
weigh any notions of abandonment or common property law in reaching this
conclusion, and favored a narrow application of the two prong Katz test.20 3
But as closed container and abandoned property cases illustrate,2° Katz can
be difficult to apply because search and seizure of tangible personal property
does not easily yield to newer legal concepts of privacy and the reasonable
expectations thereof.
IV. CALIFORNIA V. GREENWOOD: APPLYING THE KATZ RATIONALE TO
GARBAGE SEARCHES
In California v. Greenwood, the Supreme Court declared that a warrant-
less search of opaque plastic garbage bags did not violate the respondents'
constitutional right to privacy, thereby adhering to the Katz reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy standard.2 °5 In Greenwood, police discovered narcotics
paraphernalia in trash bags collected from the curb in front of the respon-
dents' home.206 The search provided police with probable cause to secure a
warrant and to search the respondents' home, where substantial amounts of
cocaine and hashish were found. 20 7 The California Superior Court dis-
missed felony narcotics charges on the basis of People v. Krivda.208 The
199. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chappee, 397 Mass. 508, 512-13, 492 N.E.2d 719, 721-22
(1986).
200. See supra note 182.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
202. 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988). The Greenwood decision received considerable media atten-
tion, including a front page headline in the New York Times. See, e.g., Taylor, Police May
Search People's Trash Without a Warrant, Court Rules, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1988, at AI, col.
4; Savage, Trash at Curb is Not Private Justices Hold, Los Angeles Times, May 17, 1988, pt. I,
at 7, col. 1; Karmen, Court Permits Warrantless Search of Trash, Wash. Post, May 17, 1988, at
A4, col. 3.
203. The majority does not mention the abandonment theory. The dissent, however, com-
mends the majority for rejecting the state's abandonment argument. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at
1634 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 120-66.
205. 108 S. Ct. at 1628-29.
206. Id. at 1627.
207. Id.
208. 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), vacated by 409 U.S. 33 (1972);
see supra text accompanying notes 193-98.
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Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal,2"9 and following the California
Supreme Court's denial of a hearing, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.21 0
A. The Majority: Remaining True to Katz?
Both the majority and the dissent in Greenwood employed the Katz rea-
sonable expectation of privacy standard, but reached varying results. In de-
termining that no violation occurred, Justice White's majority opinion2 .
observed that although the respondents may have had an expectation that
their trash would remain free from police or public rummaging in the short
time it was on the street, society does not accept such an expectation as
reasonable.21 2 Justice White reasoned that the trash was sufficiently exposed
to the public to defeat any fourth amendment claim, because trash bags left
in a public area are easily accessible to "animals, children, scavengers,
snoops," and the public in general.21 3 Justice White relied specifically on
language in Katz which cautioned that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. "214
Justice White also compared the search in Greenwood to the aerial surveil-
lance in California v. Ciraolo,215 in which the Court found that an expecta-
tion of privacy in a field exposed to aerial observation was similarly
unreasonable. 2 6 He analogized the respondents' exposure of their trash to
public inspection with the Ciraolo aerial search. The Court additionally
noted that the trash was set at the curb for conveyance to a third party, who
could have allowed the police to search it. 2 17 Justice White also relied on
the weight of federal and state court cases holding against a privacy expecta-
tion in trash.2 18
209. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628.
210. California v. Greenwood, 107 S. Ct. 3260 (1987).
211. Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Stevens,
O'Connor, and Scalia. Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at
1627.
212. Id. at 1628.
213. Id. at 1628-29.
214. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
215. 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986).
216. 108 S. Ct. at 1624.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1629-30. The majority also rejected the respondents' two alternative arguments.
First, the respondents argued that despite a California constitutional amendment that denied
the use of the exclusionary rule in cases involving violations of California but not federal law,
Krivda is still applicable, and the fourth amendment should be extended to meet this deficiency
in California law. Justice White ruled that states may "impos[e] more stringent constraints on
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B. The Dissent: The Synergetic Application of the Two Prongs
Justice Brennan, in his dissent," 9 applied a much broader vision of the
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy. He initially emphasized that a trash
bag is a container " 'closed against inspection' "220 and therefore protected
by the fourth amendment.22' In support of his proposition, Justice Brennan
cited Robbins v. California, 2 22 a case in which the Court rejected any distinc-
tions among various types of sealed containers for fourth amendment objec-
tives. 22 3 Justice Brennan also found support in United States v. Ross, 224 in
which the Court again conceded that a distinction between "worthy" and
"unworthy" containers was not constitutionally permissible.225
Finding that an individual may have an expectation of privacy in an
opaque plastic trash bag under a closed container analysis, 226 Justice Bren-
nan next addressed the issue of the containers in Greenwood being used to
discard personal items, rather than to preserve their safety or to transport
them.227 He opined that the contents of a person's trash are not essentially
less private, and the manner in which the respondents discarded the items
does not diminish their privacy expectations.228 Justice Brennan discussed
how a search of garbage can reveal "intimate details ' 2 29 of the most private
aspect of one's life, interests protected by the fourth amendment.23°
Justice Brennan then focused his attention on the public policy ramifica-
tions of the majority decision.23' He addressed the second prong of Katz,
police conduct than does the federal constitution," id. at 1630, but he refused to extend the
fourth amendment to the protection of state rights simply because privacy rights guaranteed
by individual states beyond those guaranteed by federal law are not protected by federal law.
Id. at 1630-31.
Second, Justice White rejected the respondents' fourteenth amendment due process argu-
ment. The respondents claimed that the California constitutional amendment, which revoked
the exclusionary rule as it applied to state law violations under Krivda, violated federal due
process rights. Justice White contended that California may negate the Krivda holding or any
other state property or privacy law with legislation, provided that the legislation does not
impinge on federal rights. Further, the Court noted that the fourteenth amendment does not
always bar all evidence that state or federal authorities illegally seize. Id. at 1631.
219. Justice Brennan was joined by Justice Marshall. Id. at 1631.
220. Id. at 1632 (quoting Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1978)).
221. Id.
222. 453 U.S. 420 (1981); see supra text accompanying notes 136-40.
223. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1632.
224. 456 U.S. 798 (1982); see supra text accompanying notes 141-48.
225. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1633.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1633-34.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1634.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 1635-37.
19891
Catholic University Law Review
relied upon by the majority: societal acceptance of this privacy expectation
as reasonable. 232 Justice Brennan employed a two-fold public policy analy-
sis. 2 33 First, he supported his closed container analogy with a discussion of
how refuse reflects society's behavior and private conduct, citing to a
number of studies and commentaries on the subject of garbage analysis.234
Second, he elaborated on the revulsion individuals feel when they see stran-
gers pick through their trash.23 5 Justice Brennan also pointed out the fact
that many cities and towns have ordinances forbidding such meddling in
garbage, for varying reasons of tidiness, health and safety, or the preserva-
tion of the contents' integrity.
2 36
Justice Brennan admitted that the respondents would relinquish any pri-
vacy interest in their refuse if it were strewn about the curb for the public or
the police to examine.2 37 Justice Brennan argued that the possibility that
one's trash might be rummaged through does not negate the expectation of
privacy. 238 By comparison, he asserted that the possibility of a burglar in-
vading the home does not diminish the privacy interest in the home.239 To
support this opinion, Justice Brennan looked to Katz, which provided that
" '[w]hat a person.., seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.' ,24o
Finally, Justice Brennan rejected the argument that a person necessarily
surrenders his reasonable expectation of privacy by virtui of the fact that his
property is given to a third party. 24 1 Justice Brennan noted that a person
retains his privacy interest in letters and packages that are in the temporary
custody of the post office.242 Justice Brennan summed up his dissenting
opinion by noting that the Court's decision "paints a grim picture of our
society,, 243 by allowing police to invade, unrestrained, a private aspect of a
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1634.
235. Id. at 1635. Justice Brennan cited several media commentaries, including the dis-
mayed reaction of Henry Kissinger when he discovered a reporter rummaging through his
trash. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1635-36.
238. Id. at 1636.
239. Id.
240. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967)). Justice Brennan uses
this language from Katz to contradict Justice White's assertion that public exposure of one's
activities terminates any fourth amendment protection. See id. at 1628-29. Ironically, the
decisive language utilized by both Justices appears in the same paragraph of the Katz opinion,
further demonstrating that Katz lacks a coherent standard of privacy analysis.
241. Id. at 1636-37.
242. Id. at 1637.
243. Id.
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person's life, thereby intruding upon the individual liberty that the fourth
amendment guarantees. 2 "
C. The Focus on the Second Prong
The Court in Greenwood, as in Ciraolo, Oliver, and Smith, conceded the
respondents' expectation of privacy, and therefore summarily dismissed the
first prong of the Katz test. It is the second prong, requiring a societal stan-
dard of reasonableness, that proves decisive.2 4  Reasonableness is deter-
mined, as explained in previous cases, by the criminal defendant's exposure
of his activities to third parties.2 46 In Greenwood the majority reasoned that
the respondents' placing of the trash on the curb sufficiently exposed it to the
public to render a privacy interest unreasonable, and thus a warrantless
search reasonable. 24 7 The decision, thus, is at least superficially consistent
with Ciraolo, Oliver and Smith.
248
But as Justice Brennan pointed out, trash, while admittedly a routine and
rarely contemplated aspect of daily life, nonetheless may contain scraps of
one's most private interests and activities, regardless of its discarded sta-
tus. 249 The government's right to conduct a warrantless search of trash af-
fects the public in a personal way, as what is recovered often discloses far
more than merely the object of the search.25°
In addition, trash sealed in opaque plastic bags is not in plain view, or
"exposed to the public."25' The dissent distinguished trash scattered about
244. Id.
245. See supra text accompanying note 85-86. The focus on the second prong as the deter-
minative element of the two prong Katz rationale is a development whose origins cannot be
found in the Katz opinion.
The two prongs of Justice Harlan's test are conjunctive: An individual's subjective expecta-
tion and society's objective expectations appear to require a more balanced approach-weigh-
ing each interest equally-than the treatment given by courts in cases such as Greenwood. The
two prong test has developed into a conditional test: An individual's expectation is reasonable
if society views it as reasonable. Justice Brennan's reasoning, therefore, appears to be more
consistent with the conjunctive application of the Katz prongs, giving each interest equal con-
sideration, and not eagerly dismissing the individual interest for the sake of the societal
interest.
246. See supra text accompanying note 118.
247. 108 S. Ct. at 1628.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 91-119.
249. See Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1635 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Greenwood decision
received considerable negative reaction from the media also. In the days following the deci-
sion, a number of editorials appeared in leading newspapers, highly critical of the Court's
shortsighted approach to privacy. See, e.g., Do We Really 'Expect' Snoops in Our Garbage?,
Los Angeles Times, May 19, 1988, pt. I, at 7, col. 1; Trashing Privacy, N.Y. Times, May 18,
1988, at A3, col. 1; Trash Revisited, Wash. Post, May 18, 1988, at A20, col. 1.
250. See Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1634.
251. Id. at 1628.
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the street from trash that is sealed in containers,252 thus implying that public
exposure of the contents of the trash container negates the fourth amend-
ment privacy interest, not public exposure of only the container. The major-
ity erroneously based its conclusion on the possibility of the contents being
disturbed,253 rather than the plain fact that the contents of a sealed opaque
container, even in a public place, are not exposed to the public. Justice
Brennan used these arguments to justify his finding that the respondents'
subjective expectations were reasonable, and he found those expectations vir-
tually dispositive of the issue.254
In Greenwood, two Justices arrived at opposite interpretations of the sec-
ond prong of Katz. This indicates the flaw in the Katz test: by completely
rejecting a property-based standard, Katz leaves the Court without any pre-
dictable or principled means of determining when "society" will "accept" an
individual's expectation of privacy.
V. PUTTING PROPERTY BACK INTO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Katz Narrowed Further
In California v. Greenwood, the Court emphasized what is "reasonable"
under the second prong of Katz, rather than what physical areas an individ-
ual may consider "private. '' 2 - The Supreme Court thus continues its trend
toward narrowing the scope of fourth amendment privacy interests.256 Spe-
cifically, the Court held that police may search trash receptacles placed
outside the curtilage of the home.2 57
Greenwood further demonstrates the Supreme Court's unwillingness to de-
part from the privacy analysis delineated in Katz. 258 While remnants of
property-based analysis remain in concepts such as curtilage,259 the Court
252. Id. at 1636.
253. Id. at 1628-29.
254. See id. at 1632, 1635.
255. Justice Black, in his Katz dissent, argued that the fourth amendment requires no more
than a standard of reasonableness:
With this decision the Court has completed, I hope, its rewriting of the Fourth
Amendment, which started only recently when the Court began referring incessantly
to the Fourth Amendment not so much as a law against unreasonable searches and
seizures as one to protect an individual's privacy.... The Fourth Amendment pro-
tects privacy only to the extent that it prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures of
'persons, houses, papers, and effects.' . ..
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 373-74 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 91-119.
257. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 77-90.
259. The Court in Greenwood did not emphasize the issue of the trash being outside the
respondents' curtilage. The location of the trash, however, is a key element in the decision.
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focused exclusively on privacy as the chief interest that the fourth amend-
ment protects. Additionally, Greenwood appears to have effectively fore-
closed the application of the abandoned property analysis commonly utilized
by state and lower federal courts,2" as the Court rejected concepts of state
property and privacy law,26 and failed to consider abandonment as a means
for denying the respondents' fourth amendment claim.262
Ironically, however, as the dissent points out, the numerous cases cited by
Justice White merely support the majority's holding, and not its reason-
ing.263 Such a glaring inconsistency in the majority opinion suggests an in-
herent weakness in the Katz test as it applies to tangible property or
containers such as trash receptacles. This inconsistency suggests that Green-
wood itself will prove to be of limited utility to lower courts in deciding
garbage search cases that do not precisely mirror the Greenwood fact
pattern.2 4
B. Property: A Valid Consideration Within the Scheme Of Katz
Greenwood is an example of the Court's application of nebulous privacy
concepts to fourth amendment claims involving tangible personal property
in an attempt to define the extent of the privacy interest. But the concept of
privacy is often inextricably tied to property interests.2 65 Justice White at-
The Court recently established criteria for determining the bounds of curtilage, thereby quali-
fying the property-based doctrine as a valid fourth amendment consideration. See United
States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987); see also Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628. The Court in
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), admitted that curtilage is an important considera-
tion: "The protection afforded the curtilage is essentially a protection of families and personal
privacy in an area intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where
privacy expectations are most heightened." Id. at 212-13.
The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of a garbage search conducted within the
bounds of a person's curtilage, and Greenwood does not suggest an answer. It may be inferable
from the Court's recognition that the respondents' trash was not within the curtilage of their
home, and also from the Court's recent decision in Dunn, that an intrusion into the curtilage of
the home to conduct a trash search may be a per se violation of the fourth amendment. See
Dunn, 480 U.S. at 294. But see United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d 789, 794 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 962 (1983).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 162-66, 182-84.
261. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
262. See id.
263. Id. at 1633 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
264. The Supreme Court of Nebraska relied on the Greenwood decision in State v. Trahan,
229 Neb. 683, 428 N.W.2d 619, cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3412 (1988), although in Trahan
there was some dispute as to whether the trash was within the curtilage of the respondent's
property. Because Greenwood did not specifically address this aspect of trash searches, the
Nebraska court turned to Kramer, 711 F.2d at 789, and the open fields doctrine of Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), discussed supra text accompanying notes 94-104, to com-
plement the Greenwood rationale and hold that the search was lawful.
265. Tomkovicz, supra note 4, at 658 n.58.
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tempted to justify the majority's holding based, at least in form, on the re-
spondents' privacy interest, asserting that merely because "animals,
children, snoops, [and] scavengers" might meddle in the trash, a privacy
interest is lost.26 6 Justice White could have achieved the same holding had
he considered that the respondents lost a privacy interest in their trash be-
cause they abandoned it, following the rationale employed by many lower
courts.267 Rather than relying on the possibility that third party interlopers
may have ransacked the respondents' trash, Justice White simply could have
equated their property interest in the trash with their privacy interest in it:
having voluntarily abandoned their ownership interest, respondents could no
longer reasonably expect society to support whatever subjective expectation
of privacy they may have initially held in their trash.
Such an analysis suggests neither a renunciation of the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test, nor a return to the all or nothing approach to
fourth amendment trespass interpretation applied in Olmstead and
Goldman. Rather, it presents a reconciliation of property and privacy theo-
ries, to an extent limited by the nature of the interests at stake. The use of
property concepts, such as curtilage and abandonment, would allow the
Court to bring predictability and consistency to the second prong of Katz,
and thus to the resolutions of fourth amendment questions. Privacy remains
the ultimate end to be protected, but without acknowledging that the respon-
dents' privacy interest is linked to tangible property (and not spoken words
or oral communications), the Court's resultant reasoning appears contrived,
and the Katz test becomes unworkable and essentially subjective.
Justice Brennan's analysis, in which he employs a more emphatic rejection
of abandonment theory and advocates a more balanced application of the
Katz test,26 similarly offers little guidance for lower courts. While he re-
gards distinctions between a container in an individual's possession and one
placed on the street for disposal as meaningless, 269 much of his reasoning
relies on Katz as it applies to closed container searches,2 70 and such an anal-
ysis has already proven arduous and ineffective. 27'
Moreover, under Justice Brennan's analysis, there is no obvious objective
limit to the respondents' expectations of privacy. If the act of abandonment
does not sever these expectations, and Justice Brennan asserts that it does
not, there remains no logical point at which one could say that the subject of
266. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628-29.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 162-66, 182-84.
268. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1633-35.
269. Id. at 1633; see supra text accompanying notes 227-30.
270. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1634.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 120-50.
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the search has relinquished his privacy expectations . 72 Absent such an ob-
jective basis for determining when society will accept an expectation of pri-
vacy as reasonable, the inquiry under the second prong of Katz becomes
irrelevant. The expectation extends indefinitely, and ultimately becomes the
unfounded declaration of a given judge's vision of what society ought to
accept.
VI. CONCLUSION
The legacy of the Greenwood decision is twofold. First, Greenwood, as
part of a trend of recent fourth amendment warrantless search cases, repre-
sents the Supreme Court's -unwillingness to liberally apply the Katz reason-
able expectation of privacy test. This narrowing of Katz stems from the Katz
decision's innate lack of clarity and direction. The Court's response was not
to disregard or overrule Katz, or to return to the property-based standard,
but to narrow the application of privacy analysis into a judicial tool that is
indicative of a stricter fourth amendment interpretation.
Second, the case provides state and lower federal courts with some cer-
tainty in the future adjudication of trash search claims: trash searches
outside the curtilage of the home are now constitutionally permissible.
Moreover, the Court's analysis is fully consistent, at least in form, with the
recognized reasonable expectation of privacy standard. The issue of aban-
donment, a remnant of the discredited property-based theory, is thus irrele-
vant to the issue of trash searches.
But Greenwood also shows the flaws in the Katz analysis. The majority's
reasoning fails to recognize the soundness of property concepts in determin-
ing the extent of fourth amendment privacy interests. Such considerations
would alleviate the uncertainty generated by Katz, and provide meaningful
guidance to lower courts in resolving search issues not yet specifically ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court.
David W. Cunis
272. This does not suggest that trash placed at the curb is necessarily abandoned property.
The moment at which property becomes abandoned property, thereby devoid of any privacy
expectations, is an issue about which reasonable minds can differ.
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